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Amit Shovon Ray and Subhasis Bera 
 
 
I. The OSS Model – A brief introduction 
 
The neoclassical economic literature stresses the need to protect private property 
rights in knowledge, as an incentive to create knowledge and thereby foster 
innovations and technological progress. It is often argued that there would be no 
incentive to innovate unless the innovator is granted monopoly rights, through patents 
or through other forms of intellectual property rights, over his innovations. Indeed, 
this has been the predominant model of technological progress driving today’s world 
economy. Against this backdrop, an alternative model of technological progress, 
embedded in the Open Source Software (OSS) movement, has attracted significant 
academic and policy attention in the recent years. This model is built upon the 
philosophy that knowledge can not be owned, but can only be shared – a view that is 
diametrically opposite to the widely held faith in private property rights in knowledge.  
 
The OSS model differs markedly from the conventional proprietary software 
development model. In the latter model, modern software firms or individual software 
developers rely on licensing agreements based on copyright law to receive their 
reward as license fee (Dam, 1995; Granstrand, 1999). To prevent illegal 
use/sale/distribution (with or without minor modifications) of the proprietary 
software, the developers protect their source code (a string of instructions to be 
executed by a computer to accomplish a program’s purpose) to restrict unauthorized 
users from accessing it (Meyer and Lopez, 1995). By contrast, OSS allows free and 
unrestricted access to the source code of the software, under a special kind of 




Today, an open source software development project is typically initiated by an 
individual or a small group with an interesting idea that they themselves want to 
develop. They constitute a core group for the project by inducting a number of paid 
developers to work with the organizer/management group. They have their own self 
governance (Markus et al., 2000; Cook, 2001). Initially, the core group develops a 
rough version of the code (software) that outlines the functionality envisioned. The 
source code for this first version is then made freely available on the web. In this 
organizational structure anyone from around the world is free to participate in the 
development of software and share their knowledge for its further development, again 
for free use by all.  
 
In the OSS model, knowledge creation is supposed to be fostered by voluntary and 
collective participation by all in the software development process through knowledge 
sharing. The core group, in a sense, sets the ball rolling and users and contributors 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge academic inputs and comments from Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Rajiv 
Kumar and Manmohan Agarwal. 
2 This is the reverse of the conventional copyright system and therefore, OSS is also often termed as 
copyleft software. 
  1from all over begin to contribute to an ever expanding knowledge stock. 
Technological progress in this model, therefore, is not driven by incentives to 
internalize the returns from the knowledge output (as in the case of proprietary 
software development), but sharing it with the rest of the community.  
 
Linux, Open Office, Firefox Mozilla are all products of this OSS model. These are 
important and significant products that have brought the OSS model to position itself 
as a viable and successful alternative to the proprietary model in the software sector. 
The OSS model can no longer be dismissed as an off-beat initiative of a bunch of 
social activists with limited impact on software development in totality. Large 
businesses and many Governments around the world have now adopted OSS software 
as a matter of policy choice.  
 
A critical question that arises in this context is what drives the economic agents of the 
OSS model of technological progress to create knowledge. While the existing 
literature on OSS has identified various factors (non-economic and economic) 
motivating the actors in this models, there has been very limited attempts to 
understand the underlying theoretical framework of the OSS model within the 
paradigms of neoclassical economics. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature.  
 
Essentially, there are two sets of agents acting as two complementary key pillars of 
the OSS model – (1) the core group and (2) the large body of individual user-
contributors. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that the core-group, which sets 
the balling rolling, has a larger social perspective to promote the philosophy of free 
knowledge sharing.
3 Of course, one could perceivably think of modeling their 
behavior in a standard optimization framework, but this remains outside the scope of 
the present paper. Even if the core group acts in an altruistic frame of mind, the model 
of OSS can only be sustained in the long run by the continued patronage from the 
large pool of user-contributors through their intellectual contribution to the OSS for 
its further development and improvement. In a sense, these contributions are supposed 
to supplement the effort of the core group and take forward the OSS initiative to 
ensure sustained technological progress through knowledge creation and free 
dissemination. Given that the core group comprises of a relatively small number of 
individuals (and hence may be assumed to be a small deviant group of altruists in this 
hardcore “rational” and individualistic world), the user community is much larger and 
broad based and therefore requires a behavioral explanation of their decision to 
contribute.  
 
In this paper, we attempt to analyze, within the framework of neoclassical micro-
economic theory, the decision of the user-contributors to contribute to the open 
knowledge pool of the OSS rather than internalizing their knowledge output for 
private appropriation. Section II presents a conceptual framework by reviewing the 
existing literature on motivations to contribute. Our game theoretical models are 
presented in Section III. Finally section IV summarizes and concludes the paper.  
                                                 
3 They are also often backed by the support and promotion from a large number of state and non-state 
actors In many different countries there are political initiatives trying to get public support for Open 
Source, e.g. by paying direct subsidies to open source projects, by standardizing on open source 
software in government agencies, or by requiring schools and universities to replace proprietary 
software by open source software whenever this is possible.  
  2II. Motivations to Contribute – A Conceptual Framework 
 
Although limited in number, much of the existing literature on OSS has focused on 
identifying individual’s motivation to participate in the OSS model. Raymond (1999) 
is among the initial scholars championing the cause of OSS and he sought to explain 
the apparent paradox of individual’s contribution to OSS in terms of altruism or a gift 
economy, whereby developers create and develop software for unrestricted 
distribution without expecting any private reward. Their objective is to maximize the 
combined pool of knowledge available to the society at large, which is essentially a 
multiple of their own respective individual contributions. The larger the number of 
contributors, the greater is the size of this multiplier. Raymond (1999) argues that 
OSS is a superior model in terms of the speed of development and the fixing of the 
bugs, due to the involvement of a large number of highly motivated programmers.  
 
Lerner and Tirole (2001) is perhaps the first systematic attempt to identify the key 
research questions pertaining to the OSS from an economist’s perspective. According 
to them, the incentives of individual user-contributors to contribute to OSS are well 
accounted for by economic paradigm, going beyond Raymond’s (1999) altruism 
hypothesis. Low costs (in terms of time and effort) of contribution to OSS (largely 
based on the Unix platform that most programmers have learned at high school and 
college) coupled with the attraction of getting others to improve upon their 
contributions, often used for their own specific applications, may be seen as an 
important economic incentive. Moreover, there are non-pecuniary gains like peer 
recognition, reputation building and eventual career advancement, which also reflect 
different types of incentives driving their motivation to contribute.  
 
In her candid survey of the existing literature on OSS, Rossi (2004) outlines the 
extrinsic as well as intrinsic motivations to explain individual contributions to OSS – 
the former including factors like reputation, user needs, learning and performance 
improvement and the latter reflecting altruism, reciprocity, generosity and hedonic 
satisfaction. While the nature of these various incentives has been fairly well explored 
in the existing literature, there has been very little work on explaining the various 
complementarities of these heterogeneous motivations of different individual OSS 
contributors. It is important to understand how these complementarities shape social 
interactions and social norms, in determining the final behavioral outcome of 
individual contributors.  
 
The only theoretical analysis of OSS in the paradigm of neoclassical microeconomic 
theory is by Johnson (2002), in which OSS is modeled as the private provision of 
public goods. It explains the OSS development within the framework of Bayesian 
games and looks at the welfare implications of increasing the number of contributors 
for development probabilities. By comparing the results with that of the closed source 
model, the paper concludes that while the OSS model is superior in some situations, 
some valuable projects may not be produced at all under OSS due to problems of free 
riding, especially as the community becomes large.  
 
Although, in line with Johnson (2002) our paper adopts a game theoretic framework 
to model OSS, the focus of our paper is somewhat different. We intend to analyze 
what determines the decision of user-contributors to contribute or not. This decision is 
modeled as an outcome of a strategic interaction among different user-contributors, all 
  3assumed to be rational economic agents who appreciate the mutual interdependence 
of their decisions in determining the final outcome. It is in this perspective that we use 
a game-theoretic framework to model the decision to contribute. We develop our 
model on the basis of a very simple conceptual framework. 
 
With the introduction a new OSS by their core group, the technically competent user-
contributors are faced with two options when they pick it up and modify/customize or 
further develop it according to their specific requirements – either they contribute 
their development back to the core group for uploading it in the public domain or they 
retain it for their own exclusive use (private appropriation) without bothering to 
contribute it back to the common knowledge pool. Given that he derives all benefits 
of the new technology by accessing it freely from the public domain, irrespective of 
whether he contributes or not, and given that contributions come at a cost (in terms of 
the time and resources devoted by the user), one may be tempted to conclude that a 
“rational” will always opt for option 2 and never contribute but enjoy the fruits of the 
efforts of the core group as well as other contributors to the OSS development. This is 
the standard free rider argument.  
 
But this argument is invalid when the final outcome is viewed in a strategic 
framework. Rational users will realize that others’ decision to contribute can not be 
divorced from his decision in this regard. Indeed, it makes sense to contribute only 
when there are possibilities of others contributing as well, because this leads to 
possible benefits of economies of scale by pooling contributions from a large number 
of users. This scale economy benefit can only be realized through joint contributions 
by different (multiple) users and hence the decision of these individual users can not 
be viewed in isolation from each other. It is in this perspective that we intend to 
model the decision making process of users regarding whether to contribute or not. 
Given that one user’s decision to contribute depends on the behavior of other users, 
the final outcome may be modeled as optimization through strategic interaction using 
game theory. We consider different scenarios to develop our game theoretic models, 
depending on the characteristics of the user group in question. We show different 
situations under which users will contribute and carry forward the OSS movement. 
 
III. Game Theoretic Models of User Contribution 
 
In the tradition of methodological individualism, which forms the basis of modern 
neoclassical economics, we may view users as “rational” self oriented utility 
maximizing individuals concerned only with their own personal benefits (net), 
irrespective of the benefits received by others. Others’ gains/losses are of no 
consequence to them. Accordingly, our first model of user contribution considers a set 
of homogenous user-contributors who are self oriented rational economic agents. 
However, we extend our analysis beyond this simple framework to introduce a more 
complex utility function, under the assumption that human beings are socially 
embedded and hence their utility functions (or welfare) depend not only on their own 
personal benefits but also on the gains/losses of others. Formally, if U denotes utility 
and B denotes (net) benefits with subscripts X and Y representing user X and Y, then  
UX = f (BX) if X is self-oriented  
UX = f (BX, BY) if X is socially integrated  
In the latter case, of course, the way others’ benefits/gains enter one’s utility function 
may vary from individual to individual depending on his temperament and type. 
  4Hence the users are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of their mental frame and 
preference pattern. We attempt to take this heterogeneity into consideration in our 
second set of models by clearly defining the typology of user characteristics. It may, 
however, be noted that we consider homogeneity or heterogeneity of players only in 
terms of their temperament. In all other respects (benefits, costs etc) the players are 
assumed to be identical, irrespective of their temperaments, as is.  
 
We present our models in the standard player-strategy-payoff format. 
 
III.1 Homogenous Self Oriented Users 
 
Player 




Each player has a binary strategy set to select from - either he contributes (C) or he 
does not (NC).  
 
Payoff 
The benefits to each player depend on the extent of knowledge stock created by their 
contributions, either jointly or individually:  
B (Xc, Yc) = Benefits when both users contribute  
B (Xc, Ync) = Benefits when only user X contributes 
B (Xnc, Yc) = Benefits when only user Y contributes 
B (Xnc, Ync) = Benefits when neither X nor Y contribute 
Let CX and CY denote the costs of contribution for each of the players. 
 
These benefits and costs are identical for both players. Therefore,  
CX = CY = C and B (Xc, Ync) = B (Xnc, Yc)  
 




Strategy  C NC 
C  B(xcyc) – C, 
B(xcyc) – C 
B(xcync) – C, 
B(xcync) 
NC  B(xnc yc), 
B(xnc yc) – C 0,0 
 






Let us examine the nature of the benefits from joint versus individual contribution. 
Given the complementarities of contribution by different users and the associated 
scale economies, it is quite natural that the benefits from joint contribution must 
considerably exceed the benefits from individual contribution, i.e., B(xc,yc)  >> 
B(xc,ync) = B(xnc,yc).  
 
Furthermore, the cost of contribution must be less than the benefits from joint 
contribution, B(xc,yc) > C, otherwise there is no incentive whatsoever to participate in 
  5the OSS model at all and for that matter knowledge creation in any form will be 
economially unviable. It is, however, unclear whether C is also less than the benefits 
from sole contribution or not. In case, it is, i.e., B(xc,ync) = B(xnc,yc) > C, then the 
model becomes trivial – it would be worth contributing irrespective of whether the 
other player contributes or not and OSS will progress without any difficulty. 
However, given the signifcance of the scale economies in joint contribution, it is 
perhaps more likely that there is a wide divergence between B(xc,yc) and B(xc,ync) = 
B(xnc,yc), so much so that while B(x c,yc) > C, B(xc,ync) = B(xnc,yc) < C. In other 
words, given the character of the OSS model, a single users contrbution in isolation 
does not quite make it economically viable – the benefits from sole contribution, 
though marginally positive but does not cover the costs of contribution. In fact, the 
divergence also implies that net benefits from joint contribution (B(xc,yc) – C) will be 
sufficiently large to outweigh the benefits from a free-ride on the other players sole 
contribution B(xnc,yc).  
 
These very reasonable postulates about the OSS model can now be formalized in 
terms of the following assumptions: 
B(xc,yc) > C  ……………………….………(1) 
 B(xnc,yc) < C ...............…...…………...……(2) 
 B(xc,ync) < C ................…...…..…....………(3) 
 B(xc,yc) – C > B(xnc,yc)…………..….……..(4) 
 B(xc,yc) – C > B(xc,ync) ...………….........…(5) 
 
In this game, we have two pure strategy Nash at (C,C) and (NC,NC). Given that (C,C) 
is preferred by both players, with complete information and common knowledge, this 
will be final outcome in a so-called Assurance game. With (C, C), or {contribute, 
contribute} as the outcome, the process of OSS development will move on 
unhindered.  
 
III.2 Heterogeneous Socially Integrated Users 
 
We now consider the case of users who are not self oriented (individualistic) but more 
socially integrated. We assume that the utility derived by one user is a function not 
only of the net benefit that he gets from a particular outcome but also of the net 
benefit that other users get. But they may have different temperaments or preference 
patterns regarding the benefits derived from contribution by themselves and by others. 
In the following models we intend to capture this heterogeneity among users with 
respect to their preferences/ temperament.  
 
Player 
We assume that there are two players (X and Y) both socially integrated. 
 
Strategy 
Each player has a binary strategy set to select from - either he contributes (C) or he 
does not (NC).  
 
Payoff 
To describe the payoff, we need to classify the types of players according to their 
temperament and preference pattern. We use the following nomenclature to depict the 
net benefits (NB) for a typical user (say X) under different situations: 
  6Temptation (πT)   = NBx (Xnc, Yc) 
Reward (πR)      = NBx (Xc, Yc) 
Punishment (πP)   = NBx (Xnc, Ync)  
Loser's payoff (πL)   = NBx (Xc, Ync)  
 
    Player Y 
 Contribute(C)  Not 
Contribute(NC) 
Contribute(C)  πR,πR   πL,πT   Player X 
Not 








Following the logic of our assumptions in Model 1, we posit that: 
πR > πT > πP > πL – purely from the perspective of a self oriented individualistic user.  
 
Now we define the player types according to the preference ordering of their utilities 
from different outcomes of the game. 
 
Player Type 1: Ruthless 
 
This type of player (X) is more concerned with his relative payoff vis-à-vis his 
counterpart rather than the absolute level of his payoffs. He would always like to 
make sure that his own benefits exceed the benefits of the other player, no matter 
what the absolute levels are.  Accordingly, even though πT < πR, he will consider UX 
(πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR) because in the latter situation both are equally off compared to 
the former, even though the X’s absolute payoff is less in the former. When both are 
equally off in (πR, πR) and (πP, πP), given that πR > πP, he will consider UX (πR, πR) > 
UX (πP, πP). Finally he will be worse off in (πL, πT) relative to (πP, πP) both in relative 
as well as absolute terms, he will consider UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, πT). 
Therefore combining these preferences for a typical ruthless player, we can write 
UX (πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR) > UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, πT) 
 
Player Type 2: Liberal 
 
This type does not mind if he is worse off than his counterpart in relative terms as 
long as his absolute level of payoff is higher in given situations, no matter what the 
payoff of the other player may be. Therefore his preference pattern will be strictly 
determined by his individual payoff namely: πR > πT > πP >πL
Therefore his preference pattern will be  
UX (πR, πR) > UX (πT, πL) > UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, πT) 
 
The preference ordering of different player types are summarized below: 
 
Player Type  Preference Orderings 
Ruthless   U(πT, πL) > U(πR, πR) >  U(πP, πP) >U(πL, πT) 
Liberal  U(πR, πR) > U(πT, πL) > U(πP, πP) > U(πL, πT) 
 
In this framework, there may be 4 different combinations of player types playing 
against each other. We consider each of these 4 games to depict the outcome. 
  7Assuming common knowledge in these full information simultaneous move games, as 
before, we present the results.  
 
Game 1: Both the Players (X & Y) are Ruthless Type 
 
Preference ordering for player X is UX (πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR) > UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, 
πT). Preference ordering for player Y is UY (πL, πT) > UY (πR, πR) > UY (πP, πP) > UY 
(πT, πL). In this game if player Y contributes (C) then player X will prefer NC since                     
UX (πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR). If player Y does not contribute (NC) then player X will 
prefer NC since to him UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL,πT). Hence NC is the dominant strategy 
for X. Likewise, by symmetry, NC is also the dominant strategy for Y, given that both 
are Ruthless Selfish type.  
Therefore (NC, NC) is the Nash for this game.  
 
Game 2: Player X is Ruthless but player Y is Liberal 
 
Preference ordering for player X is UX (πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR) > UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, 
πT). Preference ordering for player Y is UY (πR, πR) > UY (πL, πT) > UY (πP, πP) > UY 
(πT,  πL). In this game if player Y contributes then player X will prefer not to 
contribute since for him UX (πT, πL) > UX (πR, πR). When player X prefers not to 
contribute, player Y will also prefer not to contribute since according to his preference 
UY (πP, πP) > UY (πT, πL). Therefore both will end up not contributing to OSS and 
Nash will be (NC, NC).  
 
Game 3: Player X is Liberal but Player Y is Ruthless 
 
Preference ordering for player X is UX (πR, πR) > UX(πT, πL) > UX(πP, πP) > UX(πL, πT). 
Preference ordering for player Y is UY (πL, πT) > UY (πR, πR) > UY (πP, πP) > UY (πT, 
πL). When player Y prefers not to contribute, player X also prefers not to contribute 
since according to his preference UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, πT). Again, when player X does 
not contribute, player Y prefers not to contribute since to him UY (πP, πP) > UY (πT, 
πL). Therefore both players will end up not contributing to OSS and the Nash 
equilibrium will be (NC, NC).  
 
Game 4: Both player X and player Y are Liberal 
 
Preference ordering for player X is UX (πR, πR) > UX (πT, πL) > UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, 
πT). Preference ordering for player Y is UY (πR, πR) > UY (πL, πT) > UY (πP, πP) > UY 
(πT, πL). In this situation if player Y prefers to contribute then player X will prefer to 
contribute since to him UX(πR, πR) > UX(πT, πL). Again if player X contributes player 
Y will prefer to contribute since to him UY (πR, πR) > UY (πL, πT). Therefore both 
players will end up contributing and the Nash will be (C, C). Now, if player Y does 
not contribute, then player X will prefer not to contribute since UX (πP, πP) > UX (πL, 
πT). When player X does not contribute, player Y will prefer not to contribute since 
UY (πP, πP) > UY (πT, πL). Therefore both will end up not contributing and Nash will 
be (NC, NC). Therefore in this game, we have multiple Nash either at (C, C) or at 
(NC, NC). Again, given that (C,C) is preferred by both, this will be ensured in an 
Assurance game of complete information and common knowledge. 
 
  
  8We now summarize the Nash results obtained in these different games: 
 
  Player’s Type  Player Y 
Player X  Ruthless   Liberal 
Ruthless  (NC, NC)  (NC, NC) 
Liberal  (NC, NC)  (C, C),  
(NC, NC) 
 
It is seen that there is only one situation where both players would contribute, namely 
when both are liberal types. Whenever the game includes at least one Ruthless type 




From the above behavioral models of User contribution to OSS, we arrive at 
interesting conclusions regarding the future of OSS and its sustainability. As 
discussed earlier, in the OSS model, innovations are initiated by the core group which 
also creates a network of user-contributors. Members of this user community are 
expected to take forward the development of this initial innovation by contributing to 
the common pool of knowledge. Without the active participation of and contribution 
by the user community, the OSS movement will not proceed further. The results of 
our game theoretic model provide interesting insights as to whether users would 
indeed be inclined to contribute, within a neoclassical framework of optimizing 
behavior.  
 
In our first model, we show that if the user community comprises of a set of 
homogeneous self-oriented players, concerned with one’s own payoff without 
bothering about the payoffs of others, the Nash outcome will ensure that they all 
contribute to the OSS development and take the OSS movement forward. This firmly 
establishes the economic rationale for the OSS movement as a sustainable and viable 
model of innovation and technological progress that does not rely on incentives to 
privately appropriate the creative outputs.  
 
One may, however, challenge the basic premise (embedded in the notion of 
methodological individualism) in characterizing all users as self oriented. In the 
second set of models, therefore, we consider a set of socially integrated users with 
heterogeneous temperaments and attitude towards how they react to others’ payoffs 
(apart from their own payoffs) in shaping their preference ordering of the various 
outcomes. We make a distinction between two types of users – Ruthless and Liberal. 
Ours results show that when the user community includes only Liberal type players, 
the OSS movement will progress unhindered with active contribution from all. On the 
other hand, when the game involves at least one Ruthless player, the OSS movement 
will perhaps come to a halt, as the user community does not contribute to the common 
knowledge pool.  
 
  9The message that emanates from our paper is straight forward – as long as Ruthless 
types are excluded from the community of OSS users, the OSS model will prove to be 
a powerful alternative model of innovations and technological progress with active 
and sustained contributions from the user community comprising of liberal types.
4 
The fundamental premise of neoclassical economics that protection of private 
property rights in knowledge holds the key to technological progress, is therefore 
placed under threat, at least in this context of the OSS model. In fact, to challenge this 
premise we do not have to deviate from the basic the framework of neoclassical 
economic analysis. Indeed, our paper has shown that the decision of user-contributors 
to freely disseminate the outputs of their creative pursuits (rather than protecting 
private property rights on them for internalizing the rewards exclusively) may be 
explained in terms of rational optimizing behavior in the framework of neoclassical 
economic theory, rather than mere altruism or social activism.  
                                                 
4 An interesting follow up research question could be to explore if and how the temperament or mental 
frame itself may be endogenously determined, rather than being exogenously  
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